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Abstract
The High Court decision in Fer v McNeil (2007 HCA 5) decided that the market value ofput options issued to shareholders
over their shares in the company, as a mechanism for carrying out a share bUyMback, was ordinary income at the time of issue
in the hands of those shareholders who chose not to participate. The jurisprudential basis on which this decision was made is
not manifestly clear, but the impact of the decision has the potential to set aside the traditional distinction which has been
made between receipts which are on revenue account and those which are on capital account. This article seeks to establish
that the approach which is manifest in McNeil is out of step with established principles and that the High Court provided no
convincing reasons for setting aside the principles which have traditionally been accepted as detennining which receipts are
to be regarded as being on revenue account. This article seeks to show that the approach which is manifest in McNeil was
also apparent in the earlier majority High Court decision in Fer v MOJltgOllleJ)1 (1998) 198 CLR 639, although McNeil does
not appear to have relied on MOII/gomeIY. However, the authors seek to establish that the principles which can be derived
from the majority decision in MolltgolllelY are not sustainable. The problem which emanates from MOlllgomelY is identified
and a return to the position which existed prior to MOlltgomelY is advocated as the solution to the problem which now exists.
It is suggested that the legislative response of creating different tax treatment for call and put options is a disappointing
response, with a preferable approach being the restoration of the previous tax treatment, which had been the undertaking
given to industry and capital markets by the government.
1. INTRODUCTION
It might have been anticipated that by the beginning of the 21" century the principles
used to detelmine what constitutes income according to ordinary concepts for the
purposes of the Income Tax Assessment Acts 1936 and 1997 (Cwlth), would be clear
and settled. Regrettably, that is not so.' The confusion which has arisen is largely
attributable to recent law making by the High Court. Federal Commissioner of
Taxation ("FCT') v Montgomel)',' decided in 1999, is an early manifestation of the
High Court's attempt to set aside established principles. FCT v McNeil' is the latest.
McNeil decided that the market value of put options issued to shareholders of St
George Bank Ltd ("SGL") over their shares in SGL, as a mechanism for carrying out a
share buy-back, was assessable income on revenue account at the time of issue, in the
hands of those shareholders who chose not to participate.
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